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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
seem, therefore, that the arbitration proceeding has achieved recog-
nition, at least in the eyes of the learned dissenting justices, as an
"actual trial." 32 Such a conclusion is entirely sound, and accords
with both the nature of the arbitration proceeding and with the rules
of construction for the interpretation of insurance policies.
A
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT - MEASURE OF DAMAGES WHERE
INFRINGER'S PROFIT SHOWN.-Plaintlff sued under a subdivision of
the damage section of the Copyright Act 1 for his actual loss and the
infringer's profits, or, in the alternative, statutory damages. The
appellate court 2 found that the copyright owner had suffered damage
due to the infringement, but could not prove his actual injury; and
that the infringing party, Woolworth Company, had realized a profit
of $899.16. Based upon this evidence, the court awarded the maxi-
mum statutory damages pursuant to the "in lieu" provision of the
Act. The infringer appealed, asserting that the proof of actual profits
precluded the court from resorting to the statutory award. The
Supreme Court held that since the owner could not prove its actual
damage, statutory damages could be awarded even though actual
profits were proven. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc.,
73 Sup. Ct. 222 (1952).
The damage section of the Copyright Act was enacted to serve
a dual purpose: to provide an effective remedy for a copyright owner
who could not prove the actual amount of his damage 3 and to com-
32 It is interesting, however, to note that the dissenters nevertheless con-
curred with their brothers on the bench in maintaining that arbitration was not
a suit within the meaning of the policy, though it would be an "actual trial"
if judgment were entered on the award.
1 Any person infringing a copyright in any work protected under the copy-
right laws shall be liable:
(b) "To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright
proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits
which the infringer shall have made from such infringement . . . or in lieu
of actual damages and profits, such damages as to the court shall appear to be
just [damages for certain cases are specified] and such damages shall in no
other case exceed the sum of $5,000 nor be less than the sum of $250, and
shall not be regarded as a penalty." 35 STAT. 1081 (1909), as amended, 17
U. S. C. § 101 (Supp. 1952). None of the amendments to the original Act of
1909 have been material to the problems discussed in the article. All cases
cited under this Act have been decided under the same provisions of the statute.
2 193 F. 2d 162 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. granted, 343 U. S. 963 (1952).
3 Unless he proved specific damages, an injured copyright owner could
recover only nominal damages at common law. See Douglas v. Cunningham,
294 U. S. 207, 209 (1935).
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bine the available common-law remedies into one statutory action.4
The efficacy of this section, however, has been seriously impeded by
the conflicting interpretations given to it in the lower federal courts.
Only in cases where there are no profits earned by the infringer, and
the owner 5 has suffered damage but is unable to prove the amount
of such damage, do the courts concur in the propriety of granting
statutory damages pursuant to the "in lieu" clause.6
Very often the owner has suffered no damage from the infringe-
ment,7 and the infringer has not realized a profit. May the court, in
the absence of both factors, award statutory damages pursuant to
the "in lieu" clause? Some tribunals indulge in the fiction that an
infringement per se causes damages, and this presumed injury being
unascertainable, statutory damages may be awarded.8 Other juris-
dictions maintain that the owner must suffer actual damage, 9 for if
he does not, an award of statutory damages would be penal in nature.
Similarly, where the amount of profit earned by the infringer
is shown, but the owner is unable to prove the amount of damages
he has suffered, the cases show a diversity of opinion. Many courts
take the position that the "in lieu" provision is inoperative when
either damages or profits have been specifically ascertained. 10 Con-
versely, this "alternative theory" has been rejected, and the argument
advanced that in the absence of proving both actual damages and
4 Damages were recoverable in an action at law; profits were recoverable,
on the theory of unjust enrichment, as relief incidental to an injunction in
equity. See Sammons v. Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F. 2d 341, 345 (1st Cir.
1942) ; see Note, 22 NoTRE DAmE LAw. 313 (1947).
5 The "owner" referred to throughout this article is the copyright owner;
the "infringer," a party who may be sued for infringement under the Act.
6 Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U. S. 100 (1919); Buck
v. Milam, 32 F. 2d 622 (E. D. Idaho 1929); Sauer v. Detroit Times Co.,
247 Fed. 687 (E. D. Mich. 1917) ; see Douglas v. Cunningham, supra note 3,
at 209.
7 The measure of damage is the additional profit which the owner would
have made had not the infringing article been competing in the market. But
if the owner is not exploiting his copyright, he has not been deprived of any
potential sales, and therefore has suffered no actual damage. See Sammons
v. Colonial Press, Inc., supra note 4, at 344.
8 See Toksvig v. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F. 2d 664 (lst Cir. 1950) ; Eliot v.
Geare-Marston, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 301 (E. D. Pa. 1939) ; 8 FORD. L. REv. 264,
265 (1939).
9 Hendricks Co. v. Thomas Pub. Co., 242 Fed. 37 (2d Cir. 1917) ; Rudolf
Lesch Fine Arts, Inc. v. Metal, 51 F. Supp. 69 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); Woodman
v. Lydiard-Peterson Co., 192 Fed. 67 (C. C. D. Minn. 1912); see WVashinz-
tonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 140 F. 2d 465, 466 (D. C. Cir. 1944) ; Norm Co.
v. Brown Co., 26 F. Supp. 707, 710 (W. D. Okla. 1939); see 13 So. CALIF.
L. REv. 505, 507 (1940).
10 Davilla v. Brunswick-Balke Collender Co., 94 F. 2d 567 (2d Cir. 1938);
see Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U. S. 390, 399 (1940);
Sammons v. Colonial Press, Inc.. 126 F. 2d 341, 350 (1st Cir. 1942); see
Caplan, The Measure of Recovery in Actions for the Infringement of Copyright,
37 Micn. L. REv. 564 (1939).
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profits the court may award statutory damages." The courts, how-
ever, do concede that if the owner suffered no actual damage, but
specific profits have been proven, statutory damages should not be
awarded.1 2  The theory in this situation seems to be that since the
owner is recovering something, the "per se damage" fiction will be
disregarded.
The opportunity to resolve these inconsistencies was presented
to the Supreme Court in the instant case. The direct holding was
that if the owner suffered injury which he cannot prove, statutory
damages may be awarded even though actual profits are proven. Thus
the "alternative theory" appears to have been overruled. It must be
borne in mind that the "in lieu" provision of the Act was adopted to
obviate the necessity of proving the exact amount of over-all damage,
but did not purport to negate the production of evidence that some
actual damage was caused by the infringement.' 3  Where the owner
suffered actual damage, therefore, the proof of profits alone should
not vitiate the statutory relief and remit him to his common-law rem-
edy. Such an interpretation is repugnant to the policy of the statute,
and its repudiation was sound.
The Court also suggested that the "damage per se" fiction was
in harmony with the policy of the statute,' 4 though it left unques-
tioned the propriety of granting statutory damages when no actual
damages had been suffered and the infringer's profits were proven.
The Act declares that the statutory award is "in lieu of actual
damages"; not in lieu of nominal damages.' 5 Nominal damages were
awarded at common law either (a) where a legal wrong was shown
but no actual damage suffered, or (b) where damage was suffered
but could not be proven.' But from the very wording of the Act,
and the body of judicial opinion construing it,1 7 the statute applies
only to the latter situation. It follows, therefore, that the "damage
per se" fiction should be rejected, and that the question left un-
11 Johns & Johns Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp., 102 F. 2d
282 (8th Cir. 1939).
12 Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, sjra note 9; Malsed v. Marshall
Field & Co., 96 F. Supp. 372 (W. D. Wash. 1951).
13 See Rudolf Lesch Fine Arts, Inc. v. Metal, supra note 9, at 71; Woodman
v. Lydiard-Peterson Co., supra note 9, at 71.
14Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 73 Sup. Ct. 222 (1952).
"Even for uninjurious and unprofitable invasions of copyright the court may,
if it deems it just, impose a liability within statutory limits to sanction and
vindicate the statutory policy." Id. at 225.
15See Hendricks Co. v. Thomas Pub. Co., 242 Fed. 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1917);
Rudolf Lesch Fine Arts, Inc. v. Metal, 51 F. Supp. 69, 71 (S. D. N. Y.
1943).
18 See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Guard, 283 Ky. 187, 139 S. W. 2d 722
(1940); De Saline v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 232 Mo. App. 245, 102
S. W. 2d 779 (1937) ; 25 C. 3. S. 466 et seq. (1941).
17 See notes 3 and 9 supra.
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answered by the Court has been, in the opinion of the writer, cor-
rectly decided by the lower tribunals.' 8
In the most significant passage of the opinion, the Court stated
that where both damages and profits are proven, the court, in its
discretion, may disregard such proof and award statutory damages. 19
But when the copyright owner can prove both his damages and the
infringer's profits, the underlying basis for the "in lieu" clause is
eliminated. To allow a court in such cases to summarily dismiss the
true amount of damage and substitute a discretionary amount, far
exceeds the scope of the statute. If, therefore, the direct holding is
followed, and the dicta disregarded, the instant case will have greatly
furthered the clarification of this troublesome statute.
X
CORPORATIONS - CUMULATIVE VOTING PROVISION VOIns RE-
MOVAL BY-LAw.-Pursuant to a by-law providing for such action,
a corporate director was removed without cause, and an election was
held to fill the vacancy. Petitioner, owner of forty per cent of the
voting stock of the corporation, brought an action pursuant to Section
25 of the General Corporation Law - to set aside the election on the
ground that it violated her rights under a cumulative voting pro-
vision adopted subsequent to the enactment of the by-law. Held:
the adoption of a cumulative voting provision invalidated the by-law
insofar as it provided for the removal of a director without cause.
Matter of Rogers Imports, Inc., 202 Misc. 761, 116 N. Y. S. 2d 106
(Sup. Ct. 1952).
The purpose of cumulative voting is to afford minority interests
the opportunity to secure representation on the board of directors; 2
and it appears that express statutory authorization is a necessary pre-
requisite to its use.3 In gauging the effect of a cumulative voting
18 See note 12 supra.
19 See Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., .supra note 14, at 226.
"We think that the statute empowers the trial court in its sound discretion to de-
termine whether on all the facts a recovery upon proven profits and damages
or one estimated within the statutory limits is more just." Ibid. (emphasis
added).
"Upon the application of any member aggrieved by an election . . . the
supreme court . . . shall forthwith hear the proofs and allegations of the
parties, and confirm the election or order a new election, as justice may require."
2 See Matter of Jamaica Consumers' Ice Co., 190 App. Div. 739, 741, 180
N. Y. Supp. 384, 386 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 229 N. Y. 516, 129 N. E. 897 (1920) ;
see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 402 (Rev. ed. 1946); PRASHXM, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CopoRATixoNs 481-90 (2d ed. 1949).3 See Matter of Brophy, 13 N. J. Misc. 462, 179 Atl. 128, 129 (Sup. Ct.
1935). But see Quilliam v. Hebbronville Utilities, Inc., 241 S. W. 2d 225
1953 ]
